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In collaborative logistics, multiple carriers form a network to share their transportation 
capacities. Collaboration among carriers results in improved resource utilization and, 
therefore, reduced costs. In this thesis, we propose an auction-based model for carrier 
collaboration in transportation services. The model achieves carrier collaboration through 
facilitating the negotiation among carriers over a group of shipping orders required by 
one or a group of shippers. The negotiation is conducted through a combinatorial iterative 
auction mechanism with the objective of minimizing the carriers’ overall costs.  
We first present a centralized carrier collaboration problem model in which a central 
entity has all required information to compute an optimal solution. We then consider a 
more realistic game theoretic setting where auction-based mechanism is applied to deal 
with self-interests of carriers. Compared with one-shot auctions, the proposed iterative 
bidding framework has the properties of reducing carriers’ information revelation and 
accommodating dynamic changes during the bidding process. Experimental results show 
that the procurement cost performance and the quality of solutions computed using the 
proposed iterative auction model is close to that of the optimal solutions. 
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Chapter 1                                        
Introduction and Motivation 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
To maintain competitiveness in today’s global economy, firms have to continuously 
improve the quality of their products and services and, at the same time, reduce their 
operation costs. A key strategy to achieve these objectives is outsourcing whereby a 
company engages an external partner to carry a portion of its operations. The most 
prominent advantage of outsourcing is cost saving by leveraging economics of scale 
realized in partner organizations, better quality, flexibility, and innovation. Outsourcing 
helps the organization to shift certain responsibilities to the outsourced company. In 
addition, outsourcing helps sharpening company’s focus on core competences which 
results in improved quality of products or services. 
Transportation service procurement is an important outsourcing activity in which a 3PL 
(Third Party Logistics) handle shipping of a company’s products. Controlling costs and 
providing high service level make transportation service procurement an important task 
for companies. To answer the increasing demand for high service levels and customer 
satisfaction in today’s volatile market, 3PL companies (carriers) have turned their 
attention to collaborative logistics, which can effectively improve resource utilization and 
reduce costs through collaboration between partner carriers. Collaborative logistics is 
focused on reducing costs which cannot be controlled or reduced by individual firms 
allowing all carriers pool their resources. Greater efficiency is achieved through sharing 
carriers’ capacities to drop their empty backhauls cost and increase utilization rate of 
unoccupied capacities.  
In this research, we study how to design collaboration mechanisms for carriers to 




1.2 Challenges  
In transportation industry, shippers and carriers are under pressure to reduce their costs 
and operate more efficiently. In logistics collaboration, multiple shippers or carriers 
collaborate closely to form an alliance and consequently optimize their transportation 
operation through sharing vehicle capacities and/or delivery requests. Achieving the 
benefits of collaboration depends on close interaction between participants, identifying 
synergies and solving complicated optimization problems, which is challenging in a 
distributed market environment. 
Classical collaboration approaches usually assume a centralized environment, in which a 
decision-maker has all the necessary information to compute an optimal solution. The 
centralized approaches are suitable for the settings where all carriers are belonging to a 
common holding entity or a single organization. However, real-world markets are 
essentially distributed. It is often the case that independent carriers need to collaborate in 
order to achieve better efficiency. These carriers are self-interested. They have private 
preferences and behave strategically to increase their own profits rather than the overall 
system performance. In addition to the computational complexities inherited from the 
large scale optimization in collaborative logistics, realizing the collaboration in 
decentralized environments presents additional challenges.   First, the collaboration 
mechanism has to be designed to facilitate the interaction between independent carriers, 
such that high quality solutions can be realized through negotiation between carriers in an 
efficient way. Second, the mechanism has to be incentive compatible, that is, it can reach 
certain level of optimality despite the self-interested nature of carriers.  
1.3 Approach and scope 
To tackle the challenges of carrier collaboration in decentralized environments, we adopt 
market-based mechanisms, specifically an iterative auction model.  Auctions have been 
applied to the design of a number of real-world markets. In past years, shippers procured 
transportation services for a set of bundles through obtaining multiple quotations from 
service providers, then the best offered price of a carrier or group of carriers were 
selected to perform the services. Recently, combinatorial auction (CA) approach has been 
designed to allow the carriers submit their bids for combination of distinct items. For 
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example; a carrier company can bid for a round trip transportation services instead of 
bidding for an individual lane.  
In this study, we provide a collaborative framework for carriers, which allows carriers 
select the profitable bundles of orders and final prices of the orders are determined by 
market competition at termination of the auction. 
We proposed a combinatorial auction (CA) design for transportation service procurement 
which integrates the winner determination problem and carrier bundle optimization 
modeling. In particular, multi-round descending is used in which carriers as bidders solve 
optimization problems at each round to identify the highest profitable bundles of orders.    
In terms of the scope, we focus on logistics services in centralized and decentralized 
frameworks. In centralized coordination, we assume carriers belong to a common entity 
and in decentralized coordination carriers are assumed as profit-driven agents. We also 
assume that an auctioneer coordinates the auction procedure. This auctioneer can 
represent a group of shippers who own the orders in the auction.  
The aim of this study is to design a mechanism to distribute all proposed orders among 
the carriers with the minimum costs without revealing private information such as 
shipment costs of individual carriers.   
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
The rest of thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous studies on shippers 
and carriers collaboration in both centralized and decentralized environments with two 
transportation modes: TL (Truckload) and LTL (Less than Truckload). We also review 
various auction models and the auction-based carrier collaboration literature which is 
closely related to the work of this thesis. Chapter 3 presents detailed problem description 
in a centralized setting and cost assessment of a bundle of orders. Chapter 4 proposed an 
iterative auction model for carrier collaboration in decentralized environments. Chapter 5 
describes system implementation and verifies the performance of the proposed approach 




Chapter 2                                       
Literature Review 
In logistics, multiple shippers and carriers can collaborate to optimize their transportation 
operation through sharing vehicle capacities and delivery requests. In this chapter we 
present background information of collaborative logistics, review the literature related to 
our work, and position our work in the picture of the literature. Since our objective is to 
develop an auction-based model for carrier collaboration, we also briefly review common 
auction models. 
2.1 Collaborative Logistics 
Collaborative logistics (CL) is a business model in which two or more companies form 
partnership. The main objective of CL is obtaining as much as possible efficiencies that 
equals to providing a better service with the same cost or the same service with a lower 
cost (Langley, 2000). CL environment allows all members pool their resources.  Greater 
efficiency is achieved through sharing partners’ capacities to drop their empty backhauls 
cost and increase utilization rate (Dai and Chen, 2009). It is understood that the 
partnership cannot be dominated by individual parties and have to be managed through a 
collaboration setting. 
Partners can also be potential competitors. Collaboration among competitors demands a 
common platform to provide required communication and information sharing (Langley, 
2000). Sutherland (2006) proposed several levels of collaboration. As shown in Figure 







                                                             Consortium Collaboration 
 Multiple shippers, carriers 
 Third party facilitation 
 Information hub 
 Relationship management 
                                                    
                                               Partnership Collaboration 
 Shipper, carrier and receiver 
 Shared forecast 
 Committed capacity 
 Visibility and security 
                                         
                             Trading partner collaboration 
 Shared forecast by lane of traffic 
 Automated transaction 
                                           
                            Traditional Vendor 
   Transactional 
   No Visibility 
 
 
         
Figure  2.1: Increasing collaboration level versus increasing value (Sutherland, 2006) 
 
There are multiple forms of collaboration ranging from strategic to tactical and 
operational levels. Strategic plans are mostly concerned with supply chain and asset 
planning, while tactical-level plans entails collaboration techniques and contracts. 
Operational collaboration is a highly dynamic form of collaboration which is to maximize 
asset utilization through a fleet routing management and scheduling. The main focus of 
our study is on carrier collaboration that is a type of collaboration at operational level.     
Two types of road transportation are common in logistic services. TL (Truckload) 
transportation refers to movement of one type of merchandise with considerable volume 
from an origin point to a destination. In LTL (Less than Truckload) transportation, 
different types of goods with small quantities are shipped from multiple origins to 











Increasing collaboration level    
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never carry out on the routes while in LTL (Less than Truckload) mode the loads ship 
through multiple trailers. On the other hand, the advantage of LTL (Less than Truckload) 
is that the cost of shipment is much less when the load is only a portion of a trailer.  
Based on the roles played in logistics, there are mainly two types of collaboration, 
namely shipper collaboration and carrier collaboration.In shipper collaboration, a group 
of shippers collaborate to aggregate their shipping requests and assign them to a single 
carrier. The objective is to find optimized path with the least empty backhaul. In carrier 
collaboration, multiple carriers collaborate in order to cut their costs through sharing their 
capacities in a set of lanes that pickup/delivery services will perform. 
2.2 Collaboration through Centralized Coordination 
Traditional CL research models assume centralized settings in which an optimizer or 
coordinator has all required information to compute optimal solutions and make decisions 
on behalf of the collaborators. 
Agarwal and Ergun (2008) remarked that in a centralized setting, the profit/loss will be 
shared through a central planner with a fair mechanism. In a centralized environment, the 
optimal solution is chosen by a decision-maker and makes the system efficient. They 
mentioned that the main disadvantage for fully centralized system is being unrealistic in a 
practical situation. For example, carrier alliances with some carriers that operate with 
own assets, contracts, delivery schedule, costs and benefits will not follow a centralized 
setting.  
In centralized approach, profit/loss sharing among players is very important, while in a 
decentralized system each player follows a strategy that maximizes his own profit and 
decisions based on local information. 
Agarwal and Ergun (2008) also identified that a centralized system is applicable when a 
decision-maker selects an optimal solution for collaboration and shares the obtained 
benefits in a fair manner. However, in most of settings, designing a fully centralized 
system is not an easy task and a decentralized setting is recommended. In centralized 
systems an incentive mechanism has to be created to motivate individual partners to 
select a solution that results in maximizing the entire alliance. 
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There are several advantages and disadvantages for both centralized and decentralized 
systems. Centralized decision-making unites decisions and provides economies of scale. 
Moreover, centralization causes easy change in any process such as inventory policies or 
transportation sourcing. In a centralized system, the control of local businesses on crucial 
decisions is reduced due to the decisions that have to be taken centrally. In addition, all 
detailed information is not accessible for a central decision–maker to take optimal 
decision. However, in a decentralized setting, there is considerable misalignment between 
principal and agent. 
It is obvious that centralization and decentralization can be effected by multiple 
functions. Competitive conditions and cost margins indicate the best decision for 
selecting the more profitable environment (Rangavittal, 2008) 
Moore, Warmke, and Gorban (1991) implemented a sophisticated integer programming 
optimization model to obtain continuous movement in real time.  
In traditional approach, operation research techniques are used to develop transportation 
schedule. A new challenge claims that traditional operation research is not efficient 
enough to address all problems and plans a suitable dynamic transportation network. 
Mes, Heijden, and Harten (2007) summarize inefficiency of operation research 
techniques through following four reasons: first, in order to implement optimization 
algorithms for a large number of operation research techniques, plenty of information is 
required. Second, global optimization methods are not compatible with updating 
information and may cause serious problems on the schedules. Third, in these sets of 
algorithms, unexpected failures or orders are not permitted to enter. Fourth, multiple 
independent organizations may have self-interested preferences and do not reveal the 
private information. Therefore, traditional approach like centralized setting is not capable 
to address all problems.  
Mes et al. (2007) compare multi agent system to heuristic one on a hierarchical 
framework by considering vehicle distribution to nodes. They advocated agent systems 
performed considerably better than operation research in terms of service level, costs, and 




Shipper collaboration focuses on a single-carrier and finds an optimal routing in a 
collaboration setting among multiple shippers. Through collaboration, shippers decrease 
or eliminate asset repositioning to a carrier to get a more favourable serving price.  
Ergun, Kuyzu, and Savelsbergh (2007b) studied shipper collaboration in a centralized 
setting, formulated and solved Lane Covering Problem (LCP) in order to minimize truck 
repositioning in a Euclidean graph. They showed LCP is polynomialy solvable. Also, 
some other variants such as LCP with time windows, and availability of driver were 
considered in the model. They proved that all those variants were NP hard. Ergun et al. 
also proved that in computational experiment, better quality of solution would be 
obtained by generating more cycles. Briefly, for lane covering problem, a combinatorial 
optimization problem in shipper collaboration platform should be solved. Therefore, the 
assets repositioning cost would drop significantly. 
Dai and Chen (2012) defined shipper collaboration as the collaboration among various 
shippers that all their requests would be provided by a carrier. By shipper collaboration, 
the optimal path with minimum empty travelling would be offered to the carrier. To 
achieve mentioned objective, shippers and carriers have to increase their profitability in 
order to survive in the logistics market competition. Asset repositioning is an applicable 
proposed solution.   
Statistically speaking, in a total turnover transportation of $921 billion, the loss of empty 
truck movement is nearly 18% ,which is equal to a considerable value of $165 billion , 
and can be save potentially through an effective shipper collaboration. The aim of shipper 
collaboration is determining a set of lanes offering to a carrier as a bundle. Definitely, 
carriers prefer a bundle of lanes rather than the individual lane which will result in 
providing better quotation due to eliminating or decreasing repositioning costs. 
This study has some strengths and weaknesses. For example, generating the cycles is a 
time consuming job, or there is no mechanism to share saved profit among the players 
while the proposed theorems with relevant proofs are significantly matured.  
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Ergun et al. (2007b) remarked similar vision to shipper collaboration, where a substantial 
portion of truck movements involves in empty truck backhaul. The study developed a 
model to identify repeatable and practical movements’ tours employed frequently for TL 
(Truckload) shipments.       
2.2.2 Centralized‎Approaches‎for‎Carrier‎Collaboration 
Carrier collaboration considers how multiple carriers can cut their costs through sharing 
their capacities or orders in a set of lanes. Carrier collaboration study has been started and 
developed by several researchers in recent years. Carriers prefer the bundles of lanes that 
guarantee continuous movements. Term of “continuous moves” ideally equals to always 
having full truck with no asset repositioning cost.  
Houghtalen, Ergun, and Sokol (2007) defined a group of carriers improved their 
profitability through collaboration. It is supposed that carriers may change a portion of 
their assigned loads in order to use their empty capacities in an alliance. However, the 
main objective of this collaboration is declining transportation cost through decreasing or 
eliminating empty return and exploiting optimal trucks’ rate in the assigned network, 
which results in profit increment of the entire alliance. 
Nadarajah and Bookbinder (2007) also proposed a carrier collaboration framework in 
LTL (Less than Truckload) setting. They consider loads exchange among carriers at the 
entry logistics platform of a city. In order to solve the collaboration problem, they applied 
three-phase heuristic methods. In the first phase, vehicle routing problem with time 
windows is solved by using an integrated tabu search that use constraint-programming 
engine. In the second phase, the facilities are located by using adaptive quadtree search 
model and in the third phase, a collaborative route is built. Moreover, they conducted 
computational tests and the results proved that a good collaborative cluster is a balanced 
mixture from different carriers. However, the model is not capable to address all 
problems in LTL (Less than Truckload) carrier collaboration. 
Dai and Chen (2009) also developed a general mathematical model for logistics 
collaboration in LTL (Less than Truckload) setting with centralized mechanism. This 
model is suitable for both carrier and shipper collaboration. In this model, different 
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shippers and/or carriers participate and form an alliance. The problem is formulated as a 
mixed integer programming with the objective of minimizing transportation cost of total 
alliance; lagrangian relaxation approach is proposed to solve the problem.   
In carrier collaboration, collaboration will perform among multiple carriers in an alliance 
to handle transportation orders, and the result will substantially increase alliance profit 
(Dai & Chen, 2012). 
2.3 Collaboration through Decentralized Coordination 
Recently, decentralized system and distributed mechanisms have absorbed plenty of 
research interests. Agent-based system is a distributed approach with more flexibility and 
efficiency to a real dynamic world. In an agent-based system, each agent can be assigned 
for different objectives. Agent-based system has been applied for several important 
service domains. However, in this study, transportation service is the area of interest. 
In transportation application, all agents are autonomous and are able to control their 
behavior against a common goal. In other words, in a decentralized system, it is assumed 
that all the players are selfish and they choose a strategy to increase their own profit. In 
multi-agent system (MAS), agents’ behavior is autonomous by pursuing their own profit 
and interacts to each other in order to exchange information or using a negotiation 
mechanism. In a transportation alliance, each order (job) agent and each truck (resource) 
has its own goal. For instance, job agents insist in on-time delivery with minimizing 
possible cost, while resource agents focus on maximizing their profit and increase fleet 
optimal utilization rate. The main challenge is how to make close selfish agents’ 
behaviors to optimal solution for whole system. Proposed solution can be a market 
mechanism like an auction (Mes et al. 2007).  
Fischer, Müller, and Pischel (1995) pointed out that transportation planning and 
scheduling are inherently distributed and complex tasks. Geographically, trucks and jobs 
are distributed and also maintain some level of autonomy. To implement traditional 
methods, a scheduler must gather a large amount of information to a central place where 
the solution can be computed. However, using agent-based approach, an agent only 
requires local information. Lang, Moonen, Srour, and Zuidwijk (2008) also studied multi-
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agent systems (MAS) in logistics application. In this study decentralized is defined as 
moving away from centralized system which includes independency and flexibility. They 
defined that centralized setting was not able to address a complex and high degree of 
change and proposed the decentralized approach as an alternative suggestion . They 
conclude that planning problems in transportation have characteristics that comply with 
particular capabilities of agent systems. Specifically, these systems are able to deal with 
inter-organizational and even driven planning settings that meet supply chain’s planning 
and requirements. 
Auction mechanism, is a protocol that permits the agents to indicate their interests in one 
or more resources. Especially, combinatorial auctions (CA), have been adopted by a large 
number of shippers and 3PL (third party logistic) providers. Leading companies such as 
Wal-Mart, Procter & Gamble, and Sears have used combinatorial auctions to reduce their 
logistic costs (Sheffi, 2004)  
Robu, Noot, La Poutré, and Schinjndel (2011) remarked that transportation and supply 
chain management is fruitful domain for application of agent-based electronic markets, 
particularly auction mechanism. This study is accounted as initial studies on an agent 
auction platform in a real business scenario in Vos Logistics Company with real orders 
and cost service providing. The pick-up loads are located in the south of Netherlands and 
have to be distributed across Germany. This study focuses on automating market 
interaction between different companies in a multi-party logistics negotiation and is able 
to integrate human bidders.  
In decentralized coordination, Berger and Bierwirth (2009) studied a collaborating freight 
carriers alliance performing transportation services in a defined region. The paper focuses 
on exchanging transportation requests to facilitate collaboration among carriers. The 
framework’s goal is maximizing total profit of the entire alliance. Three different 
strategies are examined in this study: a) carriers do not collaborate, b) carriers 
collaboration in a centralized setting, and c) carrier collaboration in a decentralized 
setting. They concluded that only in a win-win situation carriers share their private 
information. Therefore, a decentralized environment based on a confidential information 
sharing was proposed. Reassigning customer’s requests was performed through two 
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auctions mechanisms: vickrey auction (VA) or combinatorial auction (CA). The 
framework is able to determine the cost of decentralized approach against centralized 
setting and also absence of any collaboration framework. Although the cost of 
decentralization is considerable, there are the solutions such as widening the amount of 
centrally known information to relieve the cost. The results proved that more competition 
among carriers contributed to increment benefit of collaboration.  
Ozener, Ergun, and Savelsbergh (2007) designed a simple lane exchange mechanism in a 
decentralized TL (Truckload) setting. Transportation costs breakdown in two main 
components: lane covering costs and repositioning costs. The main objective of proposed 
LP model is minimizing these two components in order to perform shipment requests 
through all the carriers of alliance in context of combinatorial transportation procurement 
auction. Proposed lane exchange mechanism is performed through four different carrier 
collaboration settings (mix sets of information sharing and side payment).Computational 
study shows that information sharing permits carriers to select their best strategy for 
choosing the possible lane exchange. On the other hand, side payment also is not an 
efficient approach.  
Agarwal and Ergun (2008) also designed a platform to share profit of collaboration 
among the carriers in a decentralized multi commodity flow game. Linear Programming 
applied as a tool of model development. Through this mechanism, all players are forced 
towards collaborative optimal solution using inverse optimization method. This platform 
computes capacity exchange costs which allow a player receive the revenue from its 
demands or pay the other agents for using their capacities in a collaborative environment. 
 In the rest of this section, we will review multiple types of auction and analyze the 
auction proposed in transportation service procurement in a decentralized system.  
2.4 Auctions 
Theory of auctions is reputable as one of the most practical applications of system design 
in implementing a large number of real-world markets. In transportation services, it refers 
to a mechanism allocate lanes or shipping requests to carrier agents according to some 
regulations. Most of truckload transportation procurement research use auction-based 
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methods and focus on allocating bundles of lanes to set of carriers with objective of 
minimizing total transportation costs. 
Biswas (2004) defines the auction as a mechanism for allocating a set of goods to a set of 
bidders through biddings and asks system. In a classical auction, an auctioneer allocates 
an object to a bidder.  
Auction is defined as a protocol which permits the agents express their interests in one or 
multiple resources and by using indication of interests determine allocation of payments 
and resources among them (Dai & Chen, 2012).  
Kalagnanam and Parkes (2004) presented a framework for classifying auctions based on 
the requirements which are needed to set up an auction. Transportation auctions are 
categorized as following.  
- Resources are the items that over them auction will be conducted. A mechanism 
includes a set of resources that can be a single or multiple items, and each item 
including single or multiple units (e.g. an origin-destination lane). 
- Market structure is clarified by the nature of demand and supply .The auction is a 
negotiation mechanism that matches buyers and sellers. 
- Preference structure determines utility of an agent for different outcomes. 
Preference structure helps the auctioneer to design the auctions in a way that the 
bidders with high values are allocated.  
- Bid structure, in transportation, bids can be a single item, multiple units or bundle 
of items. For single item, bids need indicate the price and for multiple units, price 
and quantity have to be specified by the bids. 
- Matching supply to demand also referred as winner determination problem or 
market clearing which is a mechanism to match supply to demand. The main issue 
is using single-sourcing or multiple-sourcing. In single-sourcing, multiple buyers 
and sellers compete whereas in multi-sourcing multiple buyers compete to a 
single seller or vice-versa. 
- Information feedback is classified into two main groups: direct mechanism and 
indirect mechanism. In direct mechanism, agents will not receive any feedback 
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like price signal (e.g. sealed bid) while for indirect mechanism, provisional 
allocation or price signals provide useful information to the agents. 
Generally, auctions have different players (auctioneer and bidders), the objects to bid on, 
participants’ pay off function, and bidders’ strategies. The object that bidders bid may be 
services, a single quantity or multiple quantities of objects. For better understanding of 
auction process, some of the functional expressions are defined as bellows.  
The equilibrium is defined as the condition that any agent intends to change its bids and 
assumed as a best-response strategy to each partners. Multiple equilibrium types are 
introduced like: Nash, Bayesian Nash, and dominant strategy equilibrium.   
Efficiency, based on a set of allocations, any agent can improve its allocation through 
making at least one agent worse off.  
Individual rationality, defines that any bidder can be worse off after participating in an 
auction than before. In other words, the expected utility from participation in a 
mechanism is non-negative with a rational strategy. 
Incentive compatibility indicates as bidder’s best interests for bidding true valuations. 
Incentive compatibility is useful for auctioneers and bidders. The reason is that 
auctioneer will be informed how much is the agent’s values over the items and it 
contributes to reducing complexity of the auction.   
Revenue maximization or cost minimization, the auctioneer is the seller who desires to 
maximize its total revenue. In contrast, if buyer is an auctioneer, total costs should be 
minimized.  
Fairness provides an allocation mechanism which is fair for all bidders in an equal 
opportunity to bid over the items. However, some players may feel unfairly treated 
because they are not selected as winner.  
2.4.1 Auction‎Types‎and‎application‎domains 
Various sorts of auctions are utilized in resource allocation mechanisms such as: single 
item auctions, Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA), iterative bundle auctions, sequential 
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and simultaneous auctions which have been studied extensively. We summarized some of 
these auction mechanisms as follows. 
1- Single item auctions  
This type of auction is useful for selling/buying a single unit of an item. Although it is 
used in the real market, in terms of computation approach is not important. English 
auction, Dutch auction and first (or second) price sealed-bid auctions are good examples 
of these traditional auctions. 
2- Multi-unit auctions 
Auctions involving the sale of different items are named multi-unit auction. 
Transportation domain can be a good example in multi-unit auctions area. In this auction, 
a buyer (shipper) and multiple sellers (carriers) wish to exploit economies of scale by 
using a volume discount auction. A lane with defined origin- destination, with a predicted 
demand volume in a specified time window can be an item for bidding.  
3- Vickrey auction  
Vickrey auction is an auction for multiple similar items. Bidders submit their demand 
simultaneously. Each bidder wins the demanded item at the clearing price, and pays the 
opportunity cost of its winnings. If there is only an item for bidding, the vickrey auction 
will be second-price auction. If the auction performs for non-identical item, the Vickrey 
auction referred to as generalized Vickery auction (GVA) or Vickery-Clarke-Groves 
(VCG).   
4- Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) 
GVA is single round second-price sealed–bid combinatorial auction, in which the highest 
bid will be the final winner, but pays the second highest bidding price. Therefore, a 
winning bidder can never affect the paid price. In addition, there is no incentive for any 
bidder to misrepresent its value. GVA is known as one of the most efficient auctions. 
5- Iterative bundle auction 
Iterative bundle auctions are indirect implementations of GVA. This type of auction is 
reputable for addressing computational and informational complexity of GVA. In this 
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class of auction, the agents are allowed to reveal essential information as the auction 
progressed. However the exact and private information has to be kept uncover by the 
agents. This auction is designed for general combinatorial allocation (CA) problem. 
6- Sequential and simultaneous auctions price bundles as the sum of each individual 
line, and assume that a set of preferred resources are auctioned in sequence. 
Agents bid on resources considering the past successes, failures, prices, and etc. 
The main application of this class of auction is in combinatorial or simultaneous 
items. Multiple goods sell in separate markets at the same time. The agents have 
to interact to separate markets in order to achieve a combinatorial of resources to 
accomplish their tasks 
For years, combinatorial auctions (CA) and its applications applied in procurement 
methods and resource allocation mechanisms. In general, combinatorial auctions (CA) 
allow bidders to place bids on bundle of items. However, winner indication required 
solving hard valuation problems and winner determination (WD) problems which can be 
prohibitive. In general, combinatorial auctions cannot apply for likely large size 
problems. During a specific known sequence, bidders bid for their selected items. Past 
successes, failures and prices are effective indicators for bidding price to a distinctive 
bundle of items. 
Biswas (2004) presented and compared some application fields of combinatorial auction 
(CA) summarized as following. 
- Collaborative Planning 
Suppose a set of jobs have to be executed by a system of robots at a lowest cost. In other 
words, n tasks have to be done by m robots, while each robot has a certain cost for 
performing the task. The overall aim is to allocate subsets of tasks to robots to minimize 
the overall cost.  
- Electronic Procurement  
Direct and indirect procurement can be performed through combinatorial auction. 
Suppose that a buyer intends to procure a bundle of items and sends RFQs to the several 
sellers. Buyer will receive the quotes and have to select the best bundles. Combinatorial 
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auction (CA) is an applicable tool for selecting the bundles of mix bids rather than 
individual items. 
- Job shop scheduling  
In scheduling concept, a set of jobs has to be scheduled for a set of defined machines. 
Deadline and delay cost has to be considered for each job. The allocation of each 
individual job to the set of machines is another application of combinatorial auction (CA) 
problem. 
-  Supply Chain Coordination  
Suppose a group of manufacturers needs some sort of parts that should be supplied 
through right combination of them. In addition, without supplying all types of 
components, manufacturer will able to run its production line. The problem is allocation 
of subsets of components to the manufacturer. Combinatorial auction (CA) is a practical 
approach to solve the problem and supply required products. 
- Travel Packages 
Selection of a travel package is another application of combinatorial auction (CA). 
Flights, hotel rooms, different entrainment tickets have to be allocated to the customers 
through such mechanism. Combination would be an important issue while a hotel room is 
useless without reserving a flight ticket.  
- Course Registration  
The main problem in course registration is allocating bundles of classes to the students. 
Each individual (student) has to be registered in some courses subject to meet minimum 
credits requirement and also any confliction among the classes is expected. 
Combinatorial auction (CA) mechanism can be a practical system for allocating classes to 
the students. 
- Bandwidth Exchange 
The bandwidth slots are exposed through public and private seller companies. There are 
also service providers who are called buyers and have valuations for bundles of 
bandwidth slots. Allocating combinations of bandwidth slots to buyers and adjusting 
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them to sellers so as to maximize the total surplus in the system, needs a strong 
mechanism such as combinatorial auction (CA). 
- Logistics Services 
Logistics procurement or transportation service is one of the main applications of 
combinatorial auction (CA). Logistics services consist of shippers who assumed to be 
rational agents would like to ship bundle of orders from one or multiple origins to several 
destination nodes and carriers who sell transportation services and submit the cost of 
shipping orders.  
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are classified in two groups; single-round auction and 
iterative auctions (multi-rounds). In a single-round auction, after solving winner 
determination (WD) problem, bidders are not allowed to submit new bids. Conversely, in 
multiple- round auction, the bidders are still permitted to submit new bids after solving 
winner determination (WD) problem.  
In the next section, we will review some literatures focusing on multi-round auctions 
theory and mechanism design. 
Iterative auctions include two different types: quantity setting and price setting. In 
quantity setting, at first round, each individual bidder sends the valuations for the items 
which intend to procure. The auctioneer allocates provisional allocation to the requested 
items depending on bidding price and in the next rounds the bidders are able to adjust 
their bidding price. In price setting auctions, each bidder submits a bundle of items that 
desire to purchase based on auctioneer price and later through adjusting the price, 
demand and supply will be balanced (Dai & Chen, 2012).  
Combinatorial auctions (CA) have been applied to truckload transportation. Chen (2003) 
used this auction in logistics domain as a mechanism of combining different items that 
one or more packages are bid by carriers. Providing better cost estimation on the 
probability of follow-on loads in packages lead to optimum transportation procurement. 




Figure  2.2: General process of multi-round combinatorial auction 
 (Kwon, Lee, & Ma, 2005) 
In this thesis, an iterative combinatorial auction is applied in order to allocate proper 
bundles of orders to the carriers.  
2.5 Auction-based carrier collaboration 
 Most of shippers use auctions to procure transportation services in a defined time 
window. Through combinatorial auctions approach their operating costs will reduce 
significantly and in the same time, unsuitable lanes will not allocate to the carriers. Large 
shippers procure their logistics services through requests for proposals (RFPs) procedure 
leading to one or two year contract. In this approach, transportation services are affected 
by economies of scope more than economies of scale. 
Economy of scale is defined as decreasing transportation costs while the volumes on all 
lanes increase in the same proportion. Economies of scope defined as decreasing 
transportation costs while the set of lanes form a synergetic network collectively.  
In other words, a carrier potentially considers a bundle of lanes that would have 
economies of scope where its revenue is more than the cost of servicing.  
Combinatorial auction (CA) mechanism is applied by a large number of shippers and 3PL 
(Third Party Logistics) providers for reducing relevant costs. Combinatorial auction 
called also combinatorial bidding, combinatorial procurement or conditional bidding. The 
carriers asked to bid on a group of lanes rather than an individual lane, considering their 
Auction rules 






























hands-on orders and facilities (Sheffi, 2004). He also remarked some important issues in 
transportation procurement and presented how combinatorial auction is capable to cope 
with the challenges.  
In TL transportation and decentralized setting, Kwon et al. (2005) proposed a multi-round 
combinatorial auction mechanism for truckload transportation procurement; the 
mechanism is integrated to the winner determination (WD) and bidder package 
optimization problem. A descending multi-round approach is used to identify a valuable 
lane package through solving an optimization problem. Each agent (carrier) bids for a 
package of lanes. This bidding mechanism is performed through solving an optimization 
model by the carriers in order to determine the best packages. Then, auctioneer computes 
a provisional allocation of lanes to carriers by solving a winner determination (WD) 
problem with the objective of minimizing costs of procuring transportation services. The 
results of mentioned mechanism revealed that both carriers and shippers reduce their cost 
through a better allocation system. In this study, transportation marketplace is modeled 
by multi-agent system and these agents share their capacities for obtaining a certain and 
common objective. Auction creates collaboration among agents. Shippers submit pick up-
delivery jobs with timing constraints in a truckload mode through sequential auctions and 
carriers attempt to accomplish their jobs in a competitive environment. In another hand, 
two policies of delaying and breaking commitment are approved to maximize shipper 
profits in an auction. 
In LTL (less than truckload) setting, Krajewska and Kopfer (2006a) proposed an auction 
model for collaboration among individual freight forwarding entities. Cooperating 
forwarders exchange their orders through a combinatorial auction (CA). The auction is 
individually rational, which means each individual partner increase its profit by 
participating in the coalition. 
Effective collaboration among agents in a distributed system results in optimized 
utilization of resources. Therefore, greater efficiency and profit for the whole system will 
be obtained. However, before entering into the partnership, agents have to agree upon 
how to share the profit resulted from the collaboration. In a collaborative environment 
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where, for example, carrier companies belong to a common holding organization, profit 
sharing may not require incentive compatible mechanisms. 
Based on reviewed studies, in a large number of distributed transportation service 
networks a practical profit sharing mechanism ignored. In a centralized setting or in a 
situation that all carrier companies belong to holding organization, profit sharing is more 
practical rather than a decentralized approach. 
An exchange mechanism is suggested by Ghjo, Schwind, and Vykoukal (2007), which is 
called ComEx and applied for inter-division of delivery orders in a logistics company 
directed by a profit center. Each cluster is a group of carriers, coordinated by a profit 
center that permit to outsource or insource the delivery contracts according to their 
geographical zones and time window in a way that whole profit of system is maximized. 
Then, each cluster will bid due to the renewed allocations and combinatorial auction, 
leads to minimization of total system. In this framework, a considerable profit will be 
gained and a potential mechanism needs to share the profit among the carriers. The 
success in exchange system depends on incentive for the profit centers to release delivery 
contracts into outsource process. Combinatorial auction (CA) mechanism is used to 
minimize total cost of transportation in a carrier collaboration system. The numerical 
experiment prove that logistics cost can drop by 14% by using ComEx system. However, 
it is not suitable setting where profit centers do not belong to a common holding 
organization and they may be reluctant to share their cost saving data. In this case, profit 
distribution mechanism and combinatorial auction is suggested.  
What will be the advantages for a carrier company if transfer its contract to another 
company for optimizing another cluster profit and receive any other transportation 
contract? Absolutely, there is not any guarantee that shared profit compensates its loss.  
In transportation services, there are a few proposed profit sharing models that distribute 
gained profit from a cost saving mechanism among the partners.  
The idea of “Groupage” system is introduced by Krajewska and Kopfer (2006b). It is an 
overview about some profit sharing approaches, and referred to as request interchange 
among multiple forwarding companies to reach equilibrium between demand and 
transport resources. They presented a complete overview on studied sharing models: Loss 
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sharing mechanism rather than profit sharing system. It is assumed that the unaccepted 
requests are always unprofitable that a central entity assign all these requests to an 
external forwarder (Schönberger ,2005), Schönsleben & Hieber (2004) proposed equally 
distribution of achieved profit among agents , Gomber, Schmidt and Weinhardt (1997) 
presented profit sharing with multi-agent auction approach where the agents bid on the 
requests, if serving a request make profit then it assumes as positive otherwise will be a  
loss situations. A bidder with the best price is chosen for performing the job. However, if 
a request shifted among partners, winner partner will pay second best bidder price. 
Finally, Krajewska and Kopfer (2006b) designed a profit distribution mechanism based 
on game theory and combinatorial auction. In this complicated model, each partner 
proposed the least cost of serving, called potential self-fulfilment of a request. A mapping 
of requests will be provided in a way that total profit of system is maximized. Each 
partner defines potential fulfilment cost for each bundle, and then combinatorial auction 
theory is applied to determine each set of optimal bundles. In profit sharing, the amount 
of obtained profit from request fulfilment will be shared among the partners.This study 
concludes that a decentralized system is technically feasible if it introduces a positive 
incentives to convince each independent agent to participate in a collaboration alliance. 
Today, planning and scheduling are used in many services and manufacturing 
organizations. The function of scheduling relies on mathematical techniques which 
allocate limited resources to the jobs or activities.  
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are used in scheduling and planning domain. Agnetis, 
Pacciarelli, and Pacifici (2007) proposed combinatorial auction models for scheduling 
problems. Combinatorial auction is used for generating the schedules, where a 
compromise schedule emanate via an iterative information exchange between bidders and 
auctioneer. 
In context of scheduling, Kutanoglu and WU (1999) investigate a new method based on a 
distributed and autonomous environment. Combinatorial auction (CA) mechanism used 
to solve resource scheduling problem. In this research, a group of price-directed auction 
is introduced for distributed scheduling. Moreover, two auction mechanisms are 
considered: Auction protocols (non-adaptive Walrasian and adaptive tatonnemwnts) and 
two payment functions (regular and augmented tatonnements). Lagrangian relaxation 
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method is applied for using subgradient search corresponds to an adaptive regular 
tatonnement. 
Song and Regan (2003) proposed spot-market where a large number of shippers and 
carriers exchange their excess capacities. Spot-market ease exchange of information, 
increase convenience, drop transaction cost and design an environment in which both 
carriers and shippers access to larger markets. In current situation, a large number of 
transportation companies compete with a low profit margin and collaborating between 
these companies lead to gaining more profit. However, they are allowed to bid on 
combinations of loads and in case of negative utility, the carrier outsources order and the 
other carriers will bid concurrently. Winner determination (WD) problem is solved in a 
collaborative carrier setting to allocate the lanes to the bidder. In this study, the feasibility 
of using such auction mechanism and its benefits is examined. To the best of our 
knowledge, ignoring a benefit sharing system and pickup/delivery time window makes 
this research impractical for real situation. 
The main focus of this thesis is on carrier collaboration problem in logistic services 
application. Multiple carriers compete in an auction-based environment to achieve 
delivery orders from a shipper to share their empty capacities in a competit ive market. 
Our study can perform in both LTL (Less than truckload) and TL environment. In 
addition, proposed mechanism for reallocating requests among the carriers is an iterative 
combinatorial auction. A unique auctioneer is fixed to update (outsource) price of each 
request, the ultimate goal is maximizing total profit of the alliance. In another hand, each 
bidder (carrier) has to select the preferable bundles of orders subject to available 
capacities for profit maximizing based on announced initial price of auctioneer. 
In this thesis two major components are used:  Multi-agent system and combinatorial 
auction (CA). Instead of designing post-collaboration, a multi agent system is proposed in 
such a way that each carrier in carrier collaboration setting is assumed as a selfish agent 
and attempts to maximize own profit in an alliance. Moreover, multi-agent system is able 
to simulate high level of negotiation and cooperation in a daily basis tasks. On the other 
hand, auction addresses the reassignment of transportation requests and sharing achieved 
profit results in carrier collaboration. 
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Chapter 3                                                
The Carrier Collaboration Problem  
We consider a specific carrier collaboration environment in which multiple carriers 
collaborate by sharing a set of job orders. The objective is to reduce transportation costs 
across all carriers. In terms of economics, this objective is equivalent to maximizing 
social welfare of all carriers. Effective collaboration can reduce or eliminate empty 
backhauls, increase utilization rate of unoccupied capacity, and allow carriers to select 
their most cost effective routes. Therefore, overall transportation cost can be reduced.  
In this chapter, we first give a description and a formulation of the carrier collaboration 
problem. The problem is formulated in a centralized sense, in which we assume that a 
central authority, such as a holding company of a group of carriers, has access to all 
required information to compute an optimal solution. After formulating the problem, we 
describe the possible procedures that can be used to assess the transportation cost of a 
carrier when taking a bundle of orders.  
3.1 Description and Formulation 
The Carrier Collaboration Problem (CCP) consists of a group of carriers and a shipper or 
group of shippers. The shipper has a set of available orders to be allocated to the carriers. 
The orders are specified by pickup/delivery time windows, pickup/delivery locations, and 
volume and weight to be shipped. Each carrier has a cost for each bundle of orders (the 
possible procedures to compute the cost are described later in this chapter). We assume 
that the cost of a bundle is the lowest price that a carrier would charge to ship the order. 
The problem is how to allocate orders to carriers in a way that the overall cost across all 
carriers is minimized.  
Formally, a CCP consists of a set of    carriers (        . Let   be the set of all 
orders from a shipper or a group of shippers. For every bundle      ,   (    is the cost 
of carrier   for shipping bundle    An order j is defined as a five tuple 
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            , where   
 
 is the pickup location ;   
  is the delivery location;    is the 
earliest possible time when the order is ready for shipping;    is the latest possible time 
by which the order is delivered; and    is the weight of the order. 
Let   (     if the bundle     is allocated to carrier   and zero otherwise.    
The problem can be formulated as following integer programming. 
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      (    (                                                                                            (1)         
 
Subject to: 
 ∑   (                                                                                                                 (2) 
 ∑ ∑    (                                                                                 
 
                                (3) 
   (    {   }                                                                                              (4)                     
The objective function (1) selects a solution that minimizes total cost of carriers. 
Constraints (2) ensure that at most one bundle could be assigned to each carrier; 
constraints (3) guarantee that each order is assigned to one carrier; and constraints (4) are 
a set of integer constraints. 
3.2 Illustrative Examples of the Carrier Collaboration Problem 
In this section, we present two illustrative examples of the CPP using the defined 
notations.   
3.2.1 Example‎1 
The first example consists of three orders (O1, O2 and O3) and two carriers (C1 and C2). 
The route network is fairly simple, which only has two nodes (a) and (b). The orders are 
specified as table 3.1.  
 
(a)                                                                                            (b) 
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Table  3.1: The specifications of three offered orders by a shipper (Example 1) 
                             Orders 
Order Configuration                   O1                                    O2                                        O3 
                                              4 T                                   2.5 T                                   15T 
                                                 a                                        a                                         b 
                                                 b                                        b                                         a 
                                               6 a.m.                                3 a.m.                                 6 p.m. 
                                               1 p.m.                               12 a.m.                              12 a.m. 
 
 
Table 3.2 presents all possible bundles of orders that these two carriers may select.   
 
Table  3.2: All possible bundles of orders (example 1) 
Bundle No.                Items                             Bundle No.                              Items              
Bundle 1                       O1                                                    Bundle 5                                 O1, O3 
Bundle 2                       O2                                   Bundle 6                                                  O2, O3                                   
Bundle 3                       O3                                   Bundle 7                                O1, O2, O3           
Bundle 4                     O1, O2                                   
 
We assume the transportation cost of a bundle is computed by a carrier using the cost 
assessment procedure that will be described later in this chapter. The cost may vary 
between the carriers. Each of two carriers has his own transportation capacity and in hand 
orders from other shippers. In addition, home fleet is stationed in node (a) for both 
carriers. We assume that all carriers’ fleet should return to their own station after 




Table ‎3.3: Cost of two carriers for each bundle of order (Example 1) 
Bundle No.                                                   Carriers 
                                                Carrier1                                   Carrier 2 
Bundle 1                                    400                                           360 
Bundle 2                                    440                                           385 
Bundle 3                                    440                                           442 
Bundle 4                                    562                                           509 
Bundle 5                                    932                                           653  
Bundle 6                                    894                                           496         
Bundle 7                                   1054                                          819   
 
We have solved this example CCP using CPLEX. The solution shows bundle 7 is 
allocated to carrier 2 with the total cost of 819.  
3.2.2 Example‎2 
The second example consists of four new orders (O1, O2, O3 and O4) and four carriers 
(C1, C2, C3 and C4) serving the orders .The route network is similar to example1, and for 
simplicity, two nodes of (a) and (b) is considered. Detailed orders’ specifications are 
illustrated in table 3.4.  
 








Table  3.4: The specifications of four offered orders (Example 2) 
                                        Orders 
Order Configuration                     O1                       O2                           O3                               O4 
                                               7 T                      10 T                        8 T                    8 T 
                                                  a                          a                              b                        b 
                                                  b                          b                              a                        a 
                                               6 a.m.                  3 a.m.                     6 p.m.                4 p.m. 
                                               1 p.m.                12 a.m.                    12 a.m.             11 p.m. 
 
All possible bundles of four submitted orders are shown in table 3.5. 
Table  3.5: All possible order bundles of orders (Example 2) 
Bundle No.        Items                             Bundle No.                            Items              
Bundle 1               O1                                                    Bundle 9                                     O2, O4 
Bundle 2               O2                                   Bundle 10                                                    O3, O4                                   
Bundle 3               O3                                   Bundle 11                                 O1, O2, O3           
Bundle 4               O4                                   Bundle 12                                 O2, O3, O4 
Bundle 5             O1, O2                                               Bundle 13                                 O1, O2, O4 
Bundle 6             O1, O3                                               Bundle 14                                 O1, O3, O4 
Bundle 7             O1, O4                                               Bundle 15                               O1, O2, O3, O4 
Bundle 8             O2, O3 
 
Similar to example 1, the carriers follow cost assessment procedure which will be 
described in the next section. The cost of each bundle may vary across the carriers. Table 




Table  3.6: Cost of four carriers for each bundle of order (Example 2) 
                                                                                  Carriers 
Bundle No.                    Carrier1                 Carrier 2                Carrier 3                Carrier 4          
Bundle 1                        500                          600                        400                          500    
Bundle 2                        600                           500                       600                          400    
Bundle 3                        600                           700                       500                          600  
Bundle 4                        700                           600                       700                          600      
Bundle 5                        1300                        1300                     1400                        1200      
Bundle 6                        1200                        1100                     1300                        1200 
Bundle 7                        1000                        1100                     1200                        1000   
Bundle 8                        1100                        1000                     1300                        1500 
Bundle 9                        1300                        1300                     1300                        1300 
Bundle 10                      1500                        1400                     1300                        1300    
Bundle 11                      1700                        1600                     1500                        1700  
Bundle 12                      1900                        2000                     1800                        1800 
Bundle 13                      1600                        1500                     1500                        1600 
Bundle 14                      1500                        1600                     1600                        1600 
Bundle 15                      2200                        2300                      2100                        2200 
 
To solve CCP example, we have applied CPLEX and the result was obtained less than 30 
seconds.  
In the solution, bundle 14 is assigned to carrier1 and carrier 2 is selected to serve bundle 




3.3 Cost Assessment of a Bundle of Orders 
In CCP, a carrier is assigned to a bundle of orders as a package, and the objective is to 
minimize the overall costs across carriers. In this section, we describe how a carrier can 
assess the cost of a bundle. We also analyse the effect of key factors on carriers’ shipping 
cost computing. Transportation cost of a bundle of orders includes (1) truck operating 
cost plus (2) cost of waiting time. 
3.3.1 Truck‎operating‎cost 
Recently, the motor carrier industry has become an interesting subject for cost analysis 
issues. In a truck cost analysis, the key factors that have significant effect on costs are 
listed as follows: 
- Truck  size (economies of scale)  
- Working hours restrictions (due to some safety or regulation reasons) 
- Road conditions 
- Load availability (can be poor in some remote locations) 
- Standard design of truck (effects on speed, fuel consumption rate, availability and 
price of spare parts ) 
- Labour, vehicles, spares and fuel costs that may vary from a place to another due to 
some uncontrollable factors such as: tax issues and local regulations 
- Quality of service  
- Delayed arrival of trucks and extra payment charge (due to unpredictable elements 
such as traffic and environment situations, cross border posts, etc.) 
- Empty movement (in order to pick up the loads from customer’s place, empty back-
haul, or return to parking station). 
3.3.1.1 Truck‎operating‎cost‎breakdown 
Generally, truckers face to different prices, products characteristics, geographical zones, 
different spare parts with various qualities, driving practices and firm’s size. Therefore 
cost estimating for a particular operator is difficult. For many efficient trucking 
operations typical trucks operating cost consists of variable and fixed costs. In the next 
section, we describe these two elements of operating cost.   
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3.3.1.1.1 Variable Costs 
Variable costs or operating costs are the costs which are bounded to truck operation. 
These costs vary with travelled miles or the amount of driven hours. The main factors 
with considerable impact on a truck variable cost are listed as follows: 
1) Fuel: One of the most effective factors in the modification of variable cost is fuel, 
easily computed by each individual. Fuel cost per kilometre equals to the volume 
of consumed fuel by each kilometre that a truck travels. The determinative 
elements are as follows: (Goodyear, 2008)  
- Vehicle’s aerodynamics design 
- Speed rate  
- Load (for each 10 kips increment in load, fuel economy will drop by 5%). 
- Driving style 
- Wheel alignment and inflation pressure  
- Environnemental conditions  
2) Labour: the labour cost is calculated as labour rate per mile or per hour if 
someone is hired to operate the truck. 
3) Tires: the cost of tiers is determined through dividing a set of tires cost by its 
expected life. 
4) Maintenance, repair and spare parts costs: maintenance and repair costs are 
complicated to calculate. This type of cost happens in routine maintenance, wear 
and unexpected incidents such as road accidents and purchase of required spare 
parts. Generally, historical cost records are used to estimate this type of cost. 
In addition, the companies have different maintenance plans to keep their trucks 
in good conditions; the older model vehicles have higher and less predictable 
maintenance costs. These multiple cost plans have profound effects on final cost 
calculation of a truck cost for serving a bundle.  
3.3.1.1.2 Fixed Cost 
Fixed cost is referred to the cost that does not vary in total when level of a truck operation 
changes. 
Fixed cost includes the items which are listed below: 
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1) Licence fees insurance and sales tax: this item is a factor of trade area, travelled 
miles, weight, and product characteristics; and generally treated as fixed costs.     
2) Management and overhead: including advertisement, communications, 
dispatching, and accounting costs.  
3) Equipment: 
-  Depreciation: depreciation is defined as the cost of a capital asset and 
calculated by subtracting the salvage value from purchase price and dividing it 
by estimated useful life.  
- ROI (Return on Investment): ROI is another portion of equipment cost. 
Interest on debt capital or return on equity investment costs are classified in 
this group.  
We conclude that there are multiple plans and policies that a company may follow to 
operate its truck fleets. These various options will significantly affect the final computed 
cost (Hofstrand & Edwards, 2008). 
Berwick & Farooq (2003) proposed truck costing software model to estimate truck costs 
under multiple conditions. Based on this study, fixed costs form around 66 % and 
variable costs form around 34% of final truck operating cost, while the major item in 
variable cost is fuel with portion of 37% and main item in fixed cost is equipment cost 
with 53%. By assuming the average operating cost of a TL (truckload) for a 20-T truck 
around $1.53  per km, the portion of fixed and variable costs would be $1  (66% of total 
cost) and $0.53  (34% of total cost), respectively.  
On the other hand, truck empty movement is a kind of resource wasting. The operating 
cost of an empty 20-T truck drops by 10 % comparing with a full truck movement. Fuel 
cost and tires depreciation play important roles in the cost reduction of an empty truck. 
(Logistics Solution Builders, 2005) 
3.3.2 ‎Waiting‎time‎cost‎ 
Waiting time or idle time is referred to a non-productive time of a truck that occurs due to 
any operation stoppage cause. There are several items that can be classified in waiting 
time category of a truck such as:   
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- Loading and unloading process 
- Hub preparation 
- Availability of required auxiliaries (for instance : lift truck)  
- Availability of weighing equipment 
- Driver’s resting time  
- Congested road during peak hours (also lead to increment of gas consumption)    
Barton (2006) calculated the cost of waiting time for each straight truck. According to his 
computation waiting time cost is around $40.2 per hour. In this thesis, we deploy 
Barton’s calculation for computing cost of waiting time.  
Barton also calculated average price of two types of trucks in two road conditions. The 
result is shown in Table 3.7.   
In our calculation, we set transportation price of a 20-T truck equal to $3.6 per kilometre 
as standard transportation price. 
 
 Table  3.7: Average price / kilometre for two truck types in two different roads conditions 
                                                                           Price per Kilometre (USD)           
Truck Type                                       with congestion                     without congestion                                                 
Straight                                                       2.97                                       2.53 
Tractor-Trailer                                            3.58                                       3.12 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3.4  Bundle of Orders 
In a regular basis, an auctioneer submits different orders that have to serve by multiple 
carriers. Each submitted order has a particular pick up and delivery locations, release and 
deadline time, weight, and travelled distance that revealed by auctioneer.  
A bundle of orders is a package of orders chosen by a carrier. For each bundle of orders, 
carrier computes its serving cost that does not depend on the other carriers. It is important 
to note that a carrier’s cost is fixed and is not a function of paid price. All carriers keep 




Given the initial price of orders, the carriers look for the bundles that not only achieve the 
least repositioning costs for their trucks, but also do obtain the most profit. The goal of 
carrier is to find an optimal trade-off between cost and revenue. However, carriers pay-
off decreases when the cost of serving a bundle increases. 
Utility of a package is defined as gained revenue from servicing a set of bundle of orders 
minus transportation costs; the objective of each carrier is maximizing its utility (Lee, 
Kwon, & Ma, 2007). 
Given the capacity of a carrier, if the carrier cannot find a way to schedule its 
transportation capacity such that the time window, load and pickup, delivery destination 
requirements of a bundle can be satisfied, the bundle is not feasible to the carrier. 
Based on description, we conclude that the carriers have different transportation costs for 
serving the same bundle of orders. 
In example1, three possible scenarios associated to the carrier’s cost computation for an 
order are described.   
3.4.1.1 Example‎1 
Assume two carriers (C1 and C2) should serve orders (O1, O2) in a simple route between 
nodes (a) and (b).  
 
(a)                                                                                           (b) 
 







Table ‎3.8: The specifications of two offered orders by a shipper (Example 1) 
                                        Orders 
Order Configuration                                       O1                                                   O2 
                                                                  10 T                                               12.5 T 
                                                                      a                                                       b 
                                                                      b                                                       a     
                                                                    2 a.m. (d1)1                                     3 p.m. (d1)                      
                                                                   12 p.m. (d1)                                    1 a.m. (d2)1                     
1:  d1: day 1, d2: day 2 
Scenario 1   
Although, the orders were similar for both carriers, the order bundle consists of O1 and 
O2 assigned to C1 due to its lower cost. In fact, C1 has another order in hand from other 
shipper that drops his round trip cost significantly (economy of scale). Table 3.9 shows 
specification of (O0) awarded to C1 by another shipper. 
 
Table  3.9: The specifications of order O0 
                                                                     Configurations 
 Order                                                                                                                        
 
  O0                                10T                      a                       b                 1 a.m. (d1)              11a.m. 
 
Scenario 2  
The impact of variable costs in carriers’ final cost is notable. For example, if one of these 
two carriers utilizes a newer truck model in its transportation fleet, the cost of performing 
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transportation service can be decreased due to reducing some variable costs such as 
following items:  
- Fuel: the new truck models are fuel efficient for their aerodynamics design and high 
performance engines.  
- Maintenance and spare parts: maintenance, repair and changing spare parts cost 
decrease significantly in new trucks models. 
Scenario 3 
Fixed cost is an important element that influences on the cost computing of an order by a 
carrier. A carrier with lower fixed cost can reduce significantly its transportation cost. 
Fixed cost varies due to one of the following reasons: 
- Different locations have various license fees insurance price and sales tax. 
- The number of trucks in a company’s fleet decreases the overhead cost. 
- In terms of ROI, each carrier may have a different amount of debt that impact on 
fixed cost 
3.4.1.2 Example‎2 
In this section, we provide a cost computational example in which a carrier calculates the 
cost of bundles for three submitted orders include: O1, O2 and O3 by a shipper. For 
simplicity we assume a lane includes two nodes (a) and (b).  
                    
                    (a)                                                                                           (b)     
The cost assumption of this example is defined as table 3.10. 
Table  3.10: The costs assumption (Example 2) 
                Item                                                                                Amount  
Full truck load operating cost                                                   1.53 USD/km 
Empty truck operating cost                                                         1. 37 USD /km 




Table 3.11 specifies the order configurations revealed by the shipper.  
Table  3.11: The orders’ configuration (Example 2) 
                                         Orders 
 Order Configuration                      O1                                      O2                                      O3     
                                            12.5 T                                2.5 T                                 20T 
                                                a                                          a                                        b 
                                                b                                          b                                        a 
                                         2 a.m. (d1)                          5 a.m. (d1)                      8 p.m. (d1)     
                                        12 p.m. (d1)                        3 p.m. (d1)                       6 a.m. (d2) 
 
The cost computation for all possible bundles of orders is provided as below.   
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We can conclude that actual cost for serving bundle of orders includes truck operating 
cost for empty or occupied truck capacity along with waiting time cost. In addition to the 
multiple described effective factors, business situation and company’s policy have major 




Chapter 4                                                  
An Iterative Bidding Framework for Carrier 
Collaboration 
The carrier collaboration problem described in the previous chapter is a centralized 
formulation in which we have assumed that carriers’ costs are known to the shipper. 
However, this assumption is not true in game theoretic settings where carriers do not 
belong to a single organization. In the game theoretic settings, carriers’ costs are private 
information and carriers will behave strategically to maximize their own benefits.  
In this chapter, we consider CCP as a decentralized decision making problem in the sense 
that actual carrier cost of delivering a bundle of orders is private information, which is 
not known to the optimizer. To deal with the decentralized nature of the problem, we 
adopt an auction-based approach. Recently, decentralized markets and distributed 
mechanisms absorbed plenty of research interests. In transportation application, agents 
are autonomous and capable to control their behaviours against a common goal. 
Decentralized solutions are defined as movement away from centralized solutions 
because of the ability to cope with a high degree of complexity and change. Lang et al  
(2008) advocated that decentralized solutions may be very appropriate where a 
centralized one is not feasible due to some practical constraints.    
We propose an iterative bidding framework for the decentralized CCP. The framework 
provides a structure for the carriers and the auctioneer to interact in a systematic way and 
eventually evolve the provisional solutions towards an optimal or near optimal one. 
Iterative bidding also reduces carriers’ information revelation and adds the potential of 
accommodating dynamic changes during the bidding process. The iterative bidding 
framework is a multi-attribute auction, which allows negotiation over price and a non-
price attribute: a carrier’s schedule. In addition, the framework has good privacy 
preserving properties. For example, unlike VCG auctions, it does not require carriers’ to 
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expose their capabilities, availabilities and configurations. Also, it does not require 
complete revelation of carriers’ costs.  
The proposed iterative bidding is a price-based combinatorial auction. The auctioneer can 
be the shipper or other management authority. In the rest of this chapter, we first present 
our auction procedure and then describe the winner determination model. Finally, a 
worked example is presented.  
4.1 Initialization 
Before bidding starts, the auctioneer presents the set of available orders to the carriers. 
Carriers select their set of feasible bundles named   . For each selected bundle subset of  
   , the carrier computes the cost described in cost assessment section. The cost of each 
bundle is calculated by each carrier independently and according to the policy of their 
companies. For each bundle of order, there is an initial price which is the maximum price 
that can be paid by the auctioneer for serving a bundle.  
The initial bidding price for bundle of orders is set to be equal to initial price. Carriers are 
able to calculate their payoff for each bundle of    by knowing the initial price and 
computed cost, where payoff is initial price minus computed cost. To keep positive 
payoff, a carrier will decrease bidding price up to calculated cost to get the bundle. Then, 
carriers will choose the bundles with the highest payoff as selected bundles to start the 
bidding process. 
4.2 Bidding Process 
In each round of bidding  , one or group of carriers are awarded as provisional allocation. 
At the beginning of each round, carriers need to update their bidding prices. For the 
carriers which included in provisional allocation at round  -1, they can keep their bids’ 
prices unchanged at round  . The carriers which are not awarded in provisional allocation 
have three updating options at round I: (1) Decrease their bidding price by   on the 
bundle bid at round I-1 since the carriers are assumed to be rational in maximizing their 
payoff.  , is the minimum decrement value fixed by the auctioneer. (2) Repeat bidding 
price at round (I-1). The carrier will be considered at final bid round and prohibited from 
 50 
 
increasing the bidding price on any of its bundles in following rounds. (3)The carriers can 
withdraw from bidding process. 
After updating the price, each carrier needs to verify the set of bundles maximize its 
payoff. In other words, a carrier solve maximization problem          [  
 (   
  (  ] where   
 (   is the price of carrier   for bundle   at iteration I and   (   is the 
cost of carrier   for bundle (  . 
After indicating a set of maximizing bundles, carrier will choose a bundle randomly and 
submit to the auctioneer with the updated bidding price. However, the carriers which 
entered in the final bid status are not allowed to increase their bidding price. 
4.3 Bids Screening 
After bids are received, the auctioneer starts screening the bids. The bids with the 
following specifications will not be considered in the winner determination procedure 
and named invalid bids: (1) any bidding price for a package higher than initial price at the 
beginning of the bidding procedure, (2) any bidding price for a same bundle which is 
higher than the highest bidding price received in previous rounds, and (3) decreased 
prices from carriers which entered at final status in previous rounds. 
After the bidding terminates, the auctioneer implements final allocation and awards final 
carriers to serve the      
4.4 Winner Determination Model (WDM) 
Auctioneer has to solve the problem in the winner determination model in order to 
indicate the final winner or group of winners. 
WDM selects a subset of submitted bids by carriers such that the total bidding price of all 
provisional allocations to be minimized.  
Let     be the set of carriers submitted their bids at round    and   
 (   the bidding price 
of requested bundle (   by carrier   and       , then   (     if the bundle     is 




The winner determination model can be formulated as following integer programming. 
   ∑           
 (                                                                                                   (5) 
Subject to: 
∑                                                                                                            (6) 
∑ ∑    (                                                                                                  (7) 
    {   } ,     
                                                                                                     (8)          
The objective function (5) represents the total bidding price of all carriers for bundle (B) 
is minimized. 
Constraints (6) ensure that awarded bids to each carrier in a provisional allocation do not 
exceed at most one bundle; constraints (7) guarantee that all submitted orders have to be 
assigned and constraints (8) are set of integer constraints.  
4.5 Worked Example 
This example consists of two orders O1 and O2 and three carriers C1, C2 and C3.The route 
network is fairly simple with two nodes (a) and (b). 
 
(a)                                                                                           (b) 
 
Each of these carriers has its own cost, which let them compute the payoff for each 
bundle. In addition, carrier’s cost information is assumed as private information and will 
not reveal neither to the auctioneer nor to the rest of participants. It is obvious that the 
carriers which enter to the auction have positive payoffs. The cost of each carrier and 
initial price for the orders is presented in table 4.1. 
In this worked example, cost assessment and price of order bundles of this example are 
not calculated based on real world cost assessment data presented in section 3.2. We aim 
to demonstrate multiple iterations procedure in combinatorial auction (CA) procurement. 
In order to limit the number of bidding rounds, initial prices are set close to the costs.  
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Table  4.1: Carriers’ costs and auctioneer’s initial price (worked example) 
                            Carrier 1                              Carrier 2                             Carrier 3 
                 B1        B2         B3            B1           B2           B3         B1           B2            B3  
Initial      100       150         250          100         150           250       100          150           250 
Price 
Cost         60        90           150          50            90           210          40            80           190 
Payoff      40        60           100          50            60            40            60            70            60      
 
The carriers need to update their bidding prices and then submit the bundle with highest 
payoff during the auction process.  
The objective is to minimize the total submitted bidding price by carriers or total 
procurement cost. It is assumed that minimum bidding price is the cost of a bundle 
computed by that carrier; therefore any of bidders will get a negative utility. In this 
example, the auctioneer sets   equal to 20.  
Iteration numbers, carriers’ submitted bids and provisional allocation of each round are 
shown in table 4.2. In submitted bids column, (a, b, c) represents for carrier number, 












Table ‎4.2: Provisional allocation, auctioneer’s cost and carrier’s pay off in each round 






1 (1,3,250),(2,2,150),(3,2,150) (1,3) 250 100 
2 (1,3,250),(2,1,100),(3,1,100) (1,3) 250 100 
3 (1,3,250),(2,2,130),(3,3,250) (1,3) 250 100 
4 (1,3,250),(2,3,250),(3,2,130) (1,3) 250 100 
5 (1,3,250),(2,1,80),(3,1,80) (1,3) 250 100 
6 (1,3,250),(2,2,110),(3,3,230) (3,3) 230 40 
7 (1,3,230),(2,3,230),(3,3,230) (1,3) 230 80 
8 (1,3,230),(2,1,60),(3,2,110) (2,1), (3,2) 170 40 
9 (1,2,150),(2,1,60),(3,2,110) (2,1), (3,2) 170 40 
10 (1,3,210),(2,1,60),(3,2,110) (2,1), (3,2) 170 40 
11 (1,1,100),(2,1,60),(3,2,110) (2,1), (3,2) 170 40 
12 (1,2,130),(2,1,60),(3,2,110) (2,1), (3,2) 170 40 
13 (1,3,190),(2,1,60),(3,2,110) (2,1), (3,2) 170 40 
14 (1,1,80),(2,1,60),(3,2,110) (2,1), (3,2) 170 40 
15 (1,2,110),(2,1,60),(3,2,110) (1,2), (2,1) 170 30 
16 (1,2,110),(2,1,60),(3,1,60) (1,2), (2,1) 170 30 
17 (1,2,110),(2,1,60),(3,3,210) (1,2), (2,1) 170 30 
18 (1,2,110),(2,1,60),(3,2,90) (2,1), (3,2) 150 20 
19 (1,3,170),(2,1,60),(3,2,90) (2,1), (3,2) 150 20 




WDM is applied to solve the worked example. The problem is solved by CPLEX in less 
than 7 seconds by implementing 20 rounds. Bundle 1 including O1 is assigned to carrier 
2, and carrier 3 is selected to ship bundle 2 consisting of O2 with total shipping cost of 
150. 
Proposed combinatorial auction is an efficient auction design using an iterative bidding 
process. Moreover, a price mechanism is designed to direct the system. In this 
mechanism, carriers behave as self-interested agents with the objective of maximizing 
their own benefits while the overall performance of system is not considered. The 




Chapter 5                                               
Computational Study 
In this chapter, we evaluate the proposed carrier collaboration framework through a 
computational study. Numerical experiments were carried out to test the performance of 
our proposed model.  
5.1 Design of testing data 
Since our main purpose is to evaluate the iterative bidding procedure, we intentionally 
assume a very simple route network which has only two nodes. However, the numbers of 
carriers and feasible bundles are at a realistic scale. In the design of testing data, it is 
assumed that there is also an initial price for each order and the price of a bundle is sum 
of these initial prices set by shipper. However, all the carriers which enter to the auction 
have positive payoffs and compete to get the most profitable bundles. The carriers’ costs 
for each order were randomly generated from 0.4 to 0.8 of initial price of that order and 
assumed as private information which is hidden from other carriers and also auctioneer. 5 
CCP groups of carriers are generated with the carrier numbers ranging from 20 to 300 
(Table5.1). For each group, 4 instances are randomly generated and each generated 
instance consists of 8 orders (O1, O2, O3, O4, O5, O6, O7 and O8) which could be served 
between nodes (a) and (b). 
Table  5.1: Number of carriers in each group 
                                                                                Group 
                                                    1                    2                     3                  4                  5 
Number of carriers                     20                  60                  100               160             300     
 




Table  5.2: Orders’ specifications 
                                                                     Configurations 
 Order                                                                                                                     
  O1                              2T                       a                        b                4 a.m. (d1)
1
       12 p.m. (d1) 
  O2                              3T                       a                        b                5 a.m. (d1)           1 p.m. (d1)       
  O3                           5T                       a                        b                6 a.m. (d1)           2 p.m. (d1)   
  O4                             2T                       a                        b                6 a.m. (d1)           2 p.m. (d1)  
  O5                             5T                       b                        a                4 p.m. (d1)         12 a.m. (d1)  
  O6                             5T                       b                        a                5 p.m. (d1)          1 a.m. (d2)
1 
  O7                             2T                       b                        a                6 p.m. (d1)           2 a.m. (d2) 
  O8                             3T                       b                        a                 6 p.m. (d1)          2 a.m. (d2)                                                                                                                                               
1:  d1: day 1, d2: day 2 
The CCP auction-based model is evaluated in terms of procurement cost performance and 
quality of solution under various bundles of orders level imposed by shipper. For 
computational study, three levels are defined: Configuration 1 consists of 8 orders and 5 
bundles, configuration 2 consists of 8 orders and 12 bundles, and configuration 3 consists 
of 8 orders and 20 bundles (Table 5.3). For each group of instances, optimal solution 
value is computed by solving CCP integer programming model presented in chapter 3.  
 
Table  5.3: Three levels of configurations 
Configuration #                          Number of Orders                  Number of feasible bundles         
            1                                                8                                                    5 
            2                                                8                                                   12 




5.2 Experimental results 
The CCP model is coded in CPLEX and 5 groups of instances problems are solved. The 
solutions derived from auction-based model are compared against optimal computed 
results. In table 5.4, first column of each configuration shows the average optimal 
solution for 5 groups of testing problems. The second column shows the carrier cost and 
the third column is procurement cost computed by the auction-based model. The value of 
  is set to 100 for all biddings.   
Table 5.4: Optimal cost, carrier cost and procurement cost generated at different 
configurations  
Group                Configuration #1                              Configuration # 2                          Configuration # 3                           
                Optimal          Carrier        Procurement          Optimal          Carrier       Procurement        Optimal      Carrier      Procurement       
                    cost               cost                cost                      cost                cost               cost                     cost            cost              cost                        
 
1                 2742             3132                 3250                   2647                3092                 3150              2590             2873               3050 
2                 2710             2796                 2950                   2620                2730                 2900              2590             2608                2850 
3                 2544            2782                  2850                   2485                2750                 2800              2468             2678                2750 
4                 2530            2742                  2750                   2419                2647                 2750              2379             2565                2650 
5                 2441            2572                  2700                   2401                2500                 2650              2367              2475               2550 
 
It is observed that, on average, optimal cost in configuration 2 and 3 decreased to 96 % 
and 95.5 % and procurement cost decreased to 98 % and 95 % of those in configuration 
1.  
The procurement cost performance of configuration 1 is shown in figure 5.1.The graph 










Figure ‎5.1: Procurement Cost vs. Optimal Cost for configuration 1 
 
Figure 5.2 and 5.3 depict rise of 13 % and 12 % of procurement cost against optimal cost 
at configurations 2 and 3, respectively. It is clearly seen that increased competition 
among multiple carriers could cause a significant decrease in procurement cost.    
 
 













































Figure ‎5.3: Procurement Cost vs. Optimal Cost for configuration 3 
 
In addition, average carrier cost increased around 8 % against optimal cost at 
configuration 1, and for the same comparison at configuration 2 and 3, 9 % and 6.5 % 
were computed. 
It is evident from the experimental results that increased competition among multiple 
carriers in both carriers’ quantities and number of bundles dimensions, can significantly 
increase  procurement cost performance and quality of solution. 
5.3 Effect of epsilon on cost performance 
In this section, we study the effect of multiple values for minimum decrement, epsilon 
( ), on a worked example to illustrate sensitivity of auction results for different 
decrements. 
5.3.1 Worked‎example 
The example includes six different orders include O1, O2, O3, O4, O5 and O6 and 65 
carriers consist C1, C2 … C65 , which classified in 3 different groups. For simplicity, we 
assume a lane includes only two nodes (a) and (b) and all trucks are stationed at node (a) 























(a)                                                                                            (b) 
Table 5.5 presents available orders specifications. 
 
Table  5.5: Order specifications 
                                                                     Configurations 
 Order                                                                                                                     
  O1                               2T                      a                        b                5 a.m. (d1)            3p.m. (d1) 
  O2                               3T                      a                        b                6 a.m. (d1)            4p.m. (d1)       
  O3                            5T                      b                        a              10 p.m. (d1)           8a.m. (d2)   
  O4                              6T                       b                        a               12 p.m. (d2)         10a.m. (d2)  
  O5                              6T                       b                        a               12 p.m. (d2)         10a.m. (d2) 
  O6                              5T                       b                        a                1 a.m. (d2)          11a.m. (d2) 
 
The carriers are classified in 3 different groups: group1 consists of C1 to C20 and bid for 3 
bundles of orders, group 2 includes C21 to C45 with 5 bidding bundles and group 3 
includes C46 to C65 and bid for 6 bundles of orders. The costs of carriers for each order 
were randomly generated from 0.4 to 0.8 of initial price of that order. All 65 carriers 
participate in the auction. The procurement cost is the final bidding price determined by 
market competition at the termination of the auction. Each bundle has an initial price 
equals to sum of initial prices of the orders contained in each bundle. For decentralized 
framework, we applied CCP auction-based model in CPLEX. The value of   is set to 30 








Table  5.6: Decentralized result 
 
Winner                Assigned                             Procurement                        No. of Iterations 
                                 Orders                                        cost 
   
    C10                        (O2, O5)                                     690                                       269 
    C16                (O1, O3, O4, O6)                            1470 
                          Total procurement cost               2160       
For observing effect of   on the results, the value of minimum decrement is generated 
ranging from 50 to 700.   
5.3.2 Epsilon‎and‎total‎procurement‎cost 
Intuitively, the smaller the value of epsilon, the lower bidding price in final round is 
expected. In figure 5.4, procurement costs fluctuation is considered. However, if we 
graph a trend line (based on a regression analysis of cost as a function of epsilon), we see 
that average procurement cost tends to increase over epsilon increment.  
 
 
























Epsilon has direct impact on number of iterations. In order to experiment the impact, we 
applied different epsilon values and concluded by increasing epsilon, the number of 
iterations decreased (Figure 5.5).  
 
Figure  5.5: Effect of epsilon on number of iterations  
5.3.4 Epsilon‎and‎processing‎time 
We use figure 5.6 to demonstrate effect of epsilon changes on processing time. Clearly, 
processing time decreases dramatically by increasing epsilon value. 
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It is concluded that the results of our proposed model for decentralized approach are close 
to centralized coordination. For computational study, three configurations were defined. 
The procurement cost performances for configuration 1, 2, and 3 are 88%, 87%, and 
88%. In addition, the quality of solution for the same configurations is computed equal to 
92%, 91%, and 93.5%, respectively.                          
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Chapter 6                                        
Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis investigates modeling and computational issues in developing solution 
approaches to decentralized problems in logistics services. Our objective is to design 
economic-based models capable of coordinating the resource allocation behaviors of 
independent entities in decentralized environments. This chapter summarizes the main 
contributions of this thesis, highlights our conclusions, and presents some future research 
directions.  
This study analyzes carrier collaboration challenges in transportation services. Although 
numerous studies have been conducted in application of combinatorial auction (CA) in 
transportation service procurement, there is a lack of study where the winner 
determination is bounded with bidder optimization through bundle of orders derived from 
a current allocation at each round. Descending combinatorial auction designed for 
transportation services procurement involves challenges for both shippers and carriers. In 
this thesis, we studied an integrated multi-round combinatorial auction design 
considering carriers’ private information. Transportation services are inherently 
distributed and agent-based systems can be appropriate approaches due to carriers 
distributed and autonomous nature. In chapter 4, we proposed a practical auction –based 
CCP model for decentralized framework. To demonstrate the application of the proposed 
models, we provide the numerical experiments in a realistic scale.   
The results of the study confirm that collaboration is beneficial. In terms of shipper, 
procurement cost decrease and also all orders will be served by the carriers. On the other 
hand, carriers are able to select feasible bundles of orders considering availability of 
transportation fleets, orders from other shippers, and the rest of restrictions. Moreover, in 
the proposed model, multiple carriers can collaborate to optimize their transportation 
operation through sharing unoccupied capacities of vehicle and delivery requests in a 
dynamic environment.  
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On the basis of the results of the numerical experiments, it can be concluded that 
procurement costs computed by the proposed model are very close to the optimal one 
derived from centralized framework. Besides, the increased competition among multiple 
carriers in terms of quantities and bundles of orders can significantly increase 
procurement cost performance and quality of solutions. 
The main result drawn from this thesis proves that collaboration among multiple carriers 
in an agent-based system can be implemented through a right combinatorial auction (CA) 
design.  
We have assumed the route network is fairly simple and only has two nodes. In real 
situations, transportation alliance expand to bundles of lanes consists of multiple origins 
and destinations. In terms of capacity, a good flexible response model is critical to handle 
multiple capacities while in our proposed model, all the trucks are identical. We will 
continue working along this direction. One of our future research topics is adding several 
nodes to serving network and designing more realistic routes. To make the model more 
practical, we will also consider different capacities for the trucks in LTL (Less Than 
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     int orderid; 










     key int packageID; 
     {int} items; 






int cost[c in carriers][p in packages]=...; 
 
 
dvar boolean X[c in carriers][p in packages]; 
 
 
minimize sum (c in carriers, p in packages)(X[c][p]*cost[c][p]); 





forall(c in carriers)sum(p in packages) (X[c][p])<= 1; 
//Guarantee that each carrier can get only one package  
 
forall (d in orders) sum(c in carriers,k in packages: d.orderid in 
k.items)X[c][k]==1 ;   









Winner determination model, coded in ILOG CPLEX (Decentralized Coordination) 
tuple Order 
{ 
  key string OID; 









 key string CID; 
 int reqPrice; 
 OrderBundle re; 






 key OrderBundle re  ; 
 int initialPrice; 
 int price; 
















 var ncarriers=carriers.size; 
 for(var c=1; c<= ncarriers; c++) 
 { 
   var temp = carriers.get("CID"+c); 
 //  writeln("current temp:") 
    //     writeln(temp); 
    //     writeln(" "); 
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   if(temp.win !=1) 
   { 
    var epsilon = 60 ; 
    if(temp.re.ordIds.size>0) 
    {  
       var oldtemp = lists[temp].get(temp.re); 
       oldtemp.price=oldtemp.price-epsilon; 
     } 
     temp.re.ordIds.clear(); 
        
    var utility=0; 
    var index; 
    for(var l in lists[temp]) 
    { 
    if(l.price-l.cost > utility) 
       { 
     utility=l.price-l.cost; 
     index=l; 
    } 
       } 
    
      
   if (utility > 0) 
    { 
    for (var i in index.re.ordIds) 
     { 
     temp.re.ordIds.add(i) ; 
     } 
    } 
   if (temp.win==-1) 
    { 
    temp.win=0 ; 
    temp.reqPrice=index.price; 
    } 
   } 
   
 //writeln("temp:"+ c +" "+ temp); 
  } 
 writeln("carriers: " +carriers); 
   } 
execute Union_initiation 
{ 
 for(var c in carriers) 
   
  Bunion.add(c.re); 




dvar boolean X[j in carriers]; 
 
minimize sum (j in carriers:(card(j.re.ordIds)>0) , l in 
lists[j])(X[j]*(item(lists[j],<j.re>).price)); 
 









forall (O in orders)  
     sum(c in carriers: O.OID in c.re.ordIds) X[c] ==1 ; 
 





    var psum = 0 
    var vsum = 0 
 for( var c in carriers) 
 { 
  if(X[c]==1) 
  { 
      c.win==1; 
   writeln("Carrier " + c.CID + " gets" + c.re + " with 
price "+ lists[c].get(c.re).price); 
          psum = psum+lists[c].get(c.re).price; 
          vsum = vsum+lists[c].get(c.re).cost; 
    
  } 
 } 
writeln ("Sum of Prices" + psum); 
writeln ("Sum of Costs" + vsum); 
} 
 
Iterative Code for Winner determination model 
main 
{ 
 var log = new IloOplOutputFile("logfile.dat"); 
 for(var i = 1; i <= 5000 ; i++) 
 { 
  writeln("round: " + i); 
  log.writeln("-------------round: " + i+ "------------------
---"); 
   
  var Source = new IloOplModelSource("New New .mod"); 
  var def = new IloOplModelDefinition(Source); 
  var Cplex = new IloCplex(); 
  var opl = new IloOplModel(def,Cplex);  
  var data = new IloOplDataSource("NE"+ i + ".dat");   
  opl.addDataSource(data); 
  opl.generate(); 
     Cplex.solve(); 
  
 ///////////////////////////////// 
 var ncarriers= opl.carriers.size; 
 for(var c1=1; c1<= ncarriers; c1++) 
 { 
  var temp1= opl.carriers.get("CID"+c1); 
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  if( temp1.re.ordIds.size>0) 
  { 
   var current1 = opl.lists[temp1].get(temp1.re); 
   var Cur_utility= current1.price-current1.cost; 
   log.writeln("Customer "+temp1.CID+" requests "+ 
temp1.re+ " with utility " + Cur_utility); 
  }  
 } 
 log.writeln("X= " + opl.X); 
 var CostSum=0; 
 var PriceSum=0; 
 for(var c2=1; c2 <= ncarriers; c2++) 
 { 
  var temp= opl.carriers.get("CID"+c2); 
  temp.win = opl.X[temp]; 
  if(temp.win==1) 
  { 
   var current = opl.lists[temp].get(temp.re); 
   log.writeln("Carrier " + temp.CID + " gets" + temp.re 
+ " with price " + current.price+ " and cost " + current.cost); 
   CostSum= CostSum+current.cost; 
   PriceSum=PriceSum + current.price; 
  } 
   
 } 
 log.writeln("Total Cost of Shipper : " + PriceSum); 
 log.writeln("Total Bidding Price: " + PriceSum);  
 log.writeln("Total Cost of Carriers: " + CostSum); 











  var next = new IloOplOutputFile("NE"+(i + 1)+".dat"); 
  next.writeln("carriers="); 
  next.write(opl.carriers); 
  next.writeln(";"); 
   
  next.writeln("orders="); 
  next.write(opl.orders); 
  next.writeln(";"); 
   
  next.writeln("lists="); 
  next.write(opl.lists); 
  next.writeln(";"); 
   
  var allAssigned= true; 
  for(var c in opl.carriers) 
  { 
   if(c.win ==0) 
   { 
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    allAssigned=false; 
    break; 
   } 
  } 
  if(allAssigned==true) 
   break; 
   
  var noRequest= true; 
  for(var c3 in opl.carriers) 
  { 
   if(c3.win==0 && c3.re.ordIds.size > 0) 
   { 
    noRequest=false; 
   } 
  } 
  if(noRequest==true) 
  { 
   break; 
  } 
   
   
 } 
 




Data Generator Code for Experiment 
clc; clear; 
N_o = 6; 
N_c = 20; 25; 20 
N_b = 3; 5; 6 
PER = zeros(N_b , N_c); 
for k = 1:N_c; 
    PER(:,k) = 1 + randperm(2^N_o - 1 , N_b).'; 
%     PER(:,k) = randperm(2^N_o , N_b).'; 
end; 
%Ini_pr = ceil(100 * rand(N_o , 1))+1000; 
Ini_pr = [600 700 750 800 650 730]; 
Bid_pr = Ini_pr; 
COST = zeros(N_b , N_c); 
for k1 = 1:N_o 
    for k2 = 1:N_c; 
        COST(k1,k2) = 0.4*Ini_pr(k1) + ceil(0.3*Ini_pr(k1)*rand); 
    end; 
end; 
%COST = ceil(100 * rand(N_o , N_c)); 
  
a = (1:2^N_o)-1; 
b = dec2bin(a); 
  
  
%idx = 1; 
for k1 = 1:N_c 
    STR = '{'; 
    for k2 = 1:N_b 
        SUM = 0; 
        SUM_int_pr = 0; 
        str = '<{'; 
        for k3 = 1:N_o 
            if b(PER(k2,k1),k3) == '1' 
                str = [str, '"OID', num2str(k3), '"']; 
                SUM = SUM + COST(k3,k1); 
                SUM_int_pr = SUM_int_pr + Ini_pr(k3); 
            end; 
        end; 
        str = [str, '} ', num2str(SUM_int_pr), ' ', 
num2str(SUM_int_pr), ' ', num2str(SUM),'> ']; 
        STR = [STR, str]; 
    end; 
    STR = [STR, '}']; 
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